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Abstract
At first glance, it seems that people should be paid in proportion to
their contribution, so if one person produces a little more than the other
one, he/she should be paid a little more. In reality, however, top performers are paid dis-proportionally more than those whose performance
is slightly worse. How can we explain this from an economic viewpoint?
We show that actually there is no paradox here: a simple economic analysis shows that in many area, it makes perfect economic sense to pay much
more to top performers.
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Formulation of the Problem

Top experts are well paid. Whatever area we take, top experts are paid
much much more than those who are almost on the same level:
• top athletes get multi-million dollar contracts while those who can run,
swim, etc., only slightly worse, get paid (if at all) several orders of magnitude less;
• top managers get millions of dollars, while managers who seem to have
almost similar skills – but somewhat worse success rate – get paid much
less: the difference between the salaries of the highest paid manager and
the next highest is usually huge.
The same phenomenon occurs in many areas of activity such as book publishing,
movie making, etc.; see, e.g., [1, 2, 4] and references therein. Even university
professors – although their salaries are much more equal – follow this trend: the
salary of the highest-paid professor is more than an order of magnitude higher
than the salary of the lowest-paid US professor.
1

From the economic viewpoint, this seem to be paradoxical. At first
glance, from the economic viewpoint, this seems to be a paradox: in economics,
everyone’s pay should be proportional to this person’s contributions, so why
should a small different in performance lead to such a huge difference in salary?
If a company pays $100K a year to a highly qualified worker, and then an
even more qualified worked who is 10% better applies for the job, a reasonable
ideas seems to pay this new person 10% more, i.e., $110K per year – but not
10 times more. So why such a seeming overpayment of top professionals consistently happens in businesses where economy should be the main driving force?
Even if we discard public universities which have other criteria of success, there
are plenty of other examples where top professionals are seemingly overpaid.
How can we explain this?
What we do in this paper. In this paper, we show that very high salaries
of top experts actually make economic sense. Specifically, we provide a simplified model of this phenomenon – simplified enough so that it can be easily
analytically studied – and we show that already in this simplified model, reasonable behavior leads to exactly the “overpayment” phenomenon – that top
experts who are even slightly better get paid much more than their nearest
competitors.
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Our Explanation

How this phenomenon can be explained in the idealized case. As
an example, let us consider investment fund managers. The quality of a money
manager is determined by the return on investment that this person can achieve:
better managers invest smarter and thus, provide a better return on investment,
while not so good managers provide smaller return on investment.
In real life, returns on investment vary from one year to another. So, when
we talk about quality of money managers, we need to take into account their
average return on investment over a certain period of time.
The fund usually gets, every year, a certain percentage p of the invested
money. Let us consider an ideal situation, in which every potential investor
known the average return on investment ri of each money manager i. Then, for
each dollar invested with the i-th manager, the investor will get, on average,
the additional amount ri − p.
Each investor wants to maximize his/her amount of money. So, each investor
will invest in a fund with the largest possible value of ri − p. So, in this idealized
situation, everyone will invest in the fund whose money manager is the superstar
– i.e., the fund i0 for which the value ri is the largest: ri0 = max ri . This fund
i

will earn money from all these investments, while all other funds will have no
money to manage at all and thus, will not survive. A money manager for which
ri is almost the same as ri0 but slightly smaller will earn nothing, while the
find that hires the superstar money manager will earn billions. Because of this
difference, it pays to provide a huge salary to the superstar manager.
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Similarly, a top engineer who come up with a slightly better and/or slightly
cheaper design will help the company take over the whole market for the corresponding gadgets – while others, whose gadgets are slightly worse or slightly
more expensive, will not survive.
What happens in more realistic situations. In reality, e.g., for money
managers, their rates of return vary so much that it is difficult to accurately
estimate the average rate of return. We can compute the arithmetic average of
the past rates of return, but, as is well known, for small samples, the sample
average is somewhat different from the expected value; see, e.g., [5]. In addition to arithmetic average, there are other possible statistics that estimate the
expected value – e.g., for symmetric distributions, we can take the median, or
we can take some robust method; see, e.g., [3].
In such case, all we can do is select a manager with the largest value of
the estimated return. For a finite sample, for which the sample-based estimates
differ from the actual expected value, based on different estimates, we may select
different managers as the best. Thus, the managers who are slightly worse than
the best one do have a chance to be selected – so the situation is not that
catastrophic for them as in the idealized situation. However, the more accurate
our estimates, the smaller the chance that they will be selected – and so, the
smaller the average salary of such managers.
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